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Abstract
In this paper we explore the proposition that, in economies with imperfect competitive
markets, the optimal capital income tax is negative and the optimal tax on firms profits is
confiscatory. We show that if the total factor productivity as well as the measure of firms or
varieties are endogenous instead of fixed, then the optimal fiscal policy can lead to diﬀerent
results. The government faces a trade-oﬀ between the fixed costs that the society pays for the
introduction of a new firm and the productivity gains associated to the introduction of a new
variety. We show that both the optimal capital income tax and the optimal profits tax depend
on the relationship between the index of market power, the returns to specialization and the
government ability to control entry.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we explore the proposition that, in economies with imperfect competitive markets,
the optimal capital income tax is negative and the optimal tax on firms profits is confiscatory. The
main contribution of the paper is to show that once we consider an endogenous number of firms or
varieties, the optimal fiscal policy can lead to diﬀerent results. In contrast with Judd (1997), we
identify some additional sources and parameters, in particular an index of market power and an
index of returns to specialization, that aﬀect the sign of both the capital income tax and the profits
tax. The rationale is that the government faces a trade-oﬀ between the fixed costs that the society
pays for the introduction of a new firm and the productivity gains associated to the introduction
of a new variety.1 Nevertheless, we find some cases where the optimal capital income tax is zero.
The empirical evidence shows that any source of capital income, profits or rents, is taxed in
most of the OECD countries. This fact has generated an important theoretical discussion in order
to find the sign and the magnitude of the optimal capital income tax. According to Judd (1985)
and Chamley (1986), in an economy with competitive markets and infinitely-lived consumers, the
optimal capital income tax in steady-state should be zero. Moreover, Jones, Manuelli and Rossi
(1993) show that there are large welfare gains associated to implement this optimal policy.
In a recent set of papers, Judd (1997, 2002) uses a representative-agent model with a fixed
number of goods produced by monopolistic competitive firms, and he finds that the optimal fiscal
policy implies a negative capital income tax and a 100% tax rate on firms profits. The basic
intuition works as follows. Since the market price exceeds the marginal cost, the government uses
a capital subsidy to counterbalance the market power and, thus, the eﬃcient capital-labor ratio is
recovered. Moreover, given that pure profits do not aﬀect any agent decision at the margin, the
government finds optimal to tax them at a confiscatory rate and lower the tax burden on other
margins. According to Judd (1997), the estimates of the welfare gains associated to implement the
optimal fiscal policy can be misleading if one takes into account that the prescribed policy implies
an investment subsidy rather than zero.2
In this paper we depart from the seminal work of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and consider an
endogenous number of firms or varieties. The environment considers two production sectors: inter-
mediate and final goods. Firms that produce intermediate goods have monopoly power that can
be characterized by a single parameter: the mark-up. However, we follow the original formulation
that Ethier (1982) proposed which clearly separates returns to specialization (or returns to variety,
as in Kim, 2004) and the monopolistic mark-up. The modeling choice has two advantages. First,
the set-up embeds the standard monopolistic competition with a fixed number of firms as a special
case. Second, and in contrast with Judd (1997), the introduction of free entry eliminates pure prof-
its in equilibrium. As a result, the optimal fiscal policy does not depend on the government ability
to distinguish between profits and other forms of capital income, but it does on the capacity to
1Throughout the paper we assume that the government can commit to the optimal policy ignoring time-consistency
issues. Clearly this is an important restriction that can change the results. However, the analysis of the time-consistent
policy goes beyond the scope of this paper.
2 In a related paper, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) show that if the government has no access to a 100% tax
rate on monopoly profits, then the Friedman rule is not optimal and the government resorts to a positive nominal
interest rate as an indirect way to tax profits.
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control the entry and exit of firms.3,4 In this sense, the findings with restricted entry describes the
short-run equilibrium. Besides, the entry of new firms can be interpreted as R&D in the production
of new inputs, which increases the total productivity of the economy, as in the endogenous growth
literature. However, our specification of the final goods production function, based on Benassy
(1996), diﬀers from the conventional endogenous growth model of Romer (1996). While Benassy
(1996) shows that the market equilibrium can generate too much innovation or entry (the number
of intermediate goods is higher than in the social optimum equilibrium), the resources devoted to
R&D are ineﬃciently low in the models based on the Romer framework. Therefore, we can have
two possible situations: in the first the government has to subsidize the entry of new firms in order
to foster innovation, whereas in the second situation the government has to tax profits in order to
restrict the entry of new firms, since the entry of new firms represents a social waste of resources.
The economy with imperfect competitive markets and free entry has two sources of ineﬃciencies.
The first ineﬃciency is the price-marginal cost distortion or mark-up distortion: the monopoly
power in the intermediate goods sector reduces the wage and the interest rate below the marginal
productivity of labor and capital. There exists a second ineﬃciency: the market equilibrium can
generate an ineﬃcient level of firms, since when a firm has to decide if entering into the market, it
only considers if the monopoly profits are higher than the fixed cost, and it ignores the productivity
gains generated by the introduction of a new intermediate good. Hence, the private benefits from
entry (monopoly profits) can be diﬀerent than the social benefits (productivity increase).
The introduction of a new firm in the market is determined by two opposite eﬀects: a com-
plementary eﬀect and a business-stealing eﬀect. The complementary eﬀect tends to generate an
ineﬃciently low number of firms, since firms do not take into account the positive eﬀect on total
productivity when they enter into the market. The business-stealing eﬀect tends to produce an
excessive entry of firms, since new firms enter into the market attracted by high profits but they do
not take into account the negative eﬀect on the incumbent firms due to the fact that the existing
firms in the market have to share the demand with the new firm although this new firm produces
a diﬀerentiated product and it does not compete directly with the incumbent firms. Consequently,
if the government does not control the entry, the market could generate a number of firms too low
(high) relative to the social optimum when the monopoly profits are too low (high).
We show that in the first-best solution, the mark-up distortion does not depend on the number
of firms in the market. Consequently, the optimal policy ensures that the private return and the
social return coincide and then, as in Judd (1997), the distortion associated to the monopoly power
is eﬀectively eliminated. However, taxation on gross profits can be positive, negative or zero, and
is used to determine the eﬃcient number of firms.
In the second-best, the optimal fiscal policy is characterized by the fact that the government
could or not dispose of enough fiscal instruments to control the firms entry.5 We consider three
diﬀerent cases. In the first case the government disposes of a complete set of fiscal instruments and,
therefore, it can directly control entry through the profits tax. We show that the optimal capital
income tax is negative regardless of the relative magnitude of the returns to specialization with
respect to the mark-up. By implementing the optimal capital income tax, the government recovers
3Guo and Lansing (1999) introduce physical capital depreciation, depreciation tax allowances and endogenous
government expenditure in Judd’s (1997) imperfect competition model. They show that if the government can fully
confiscate profits, then the steady-state capital income tax is negative. However, in the case that the tax authority
cannot diﬀerentiate between capital income and profits, they find that the optimal capital income tax in steady-state
can be negative, positive or zero, depending on the degree of monopoly power, the size of the depreciation allowances
and the magnitude of the government expenditure.
4Judd (1997) considers the returns to specialization or “taste for variety” as Grossman and Helpman (1991).
5 In this formulation, exit would not occur in equilibrium. However, in the presence of technology shocks there
could be exit in equilibrium.
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the eﬃcient capital-labor ratio. The optimal profits tax depends on the relationship between the
mark-up and the returns to specialization, whereas the labor tax bears the tax burden.
In the second case we assume that the government cannot diﬀerentiate monopoly profits from
capital income and, as a result, both are taxed at the same rate. Hence, the government levies
a corporate tax on any source of income generated by the firms. While Guo and Lansing (1999)
consider the optimal corporate tax in an economy without entry and where the corporate tax is used
by the government as an indirect way to tax the monopoly profits, in our case the government can
indirectly control the firms’ entry through the corporate tax. We find that the optimal corporate
tax depends not only on the magnitude of the returns to specialization and the mark-up, but
also on the fixed cost and the curvature degree of the production function. This curvature degree
captures the trade-oﬀ between the fixed costs that society pays for the introduction of a new firm
(business-stealing eﬀect) and the productivity gains associated to the introduction of a new variety
(complementary eﬀect).
The third case assumes that the number of firms or varieties cannot be aﬀected by the fiscal
authority. In this scenario the number of firms is pinned-down by the zero-profit condition in the
market equilibrium, which is taken as a constraint by the government. In comparison with the
previous two cases, we find that the optimal capital income tax only depends on the returns to
specialization. Surprisingly, in the absence of returns to specialization the implied value is zero.
This result is consistent with some theoretical findings in the industrial organization literature (see
Benassy, 1998, de Groot and Nahuis, 1998, or Jones and Williams, 2000), that show that when the
returns to specialization are not present, a tax or a subsidy leads to a socially ineﬃcient number of
firms. Moreover, the optimal number or measure of firms is one, as in Judd (1997). However, the
threat of endogenous entry makes the prescribed capital income tax to be zero instead of negative.
Finally, we show when these results can be extended to the transition path.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the basic
framework and derive the market equilibrium. In section 3 we compare the market allocation
with the social optimum in order to identify the main source of ineﬃciencies. This comparison is
useful to understand the trade-oﬀ’s that the government faces when choosing the optimal policy,
which is discussed in section 4, where we analyze the optimal fiscal policy depending on the fiscal
instruments available to the government. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2. Market equilibrium
We consider an infinite-horizon production economy with imperfect competitive product markets.
The government finances an exogenous stream of purchases by levying distortionary taxes. There
is a unique final good Y which is produced by competitive firms through the following technology
(as in Benassy, 1996)6:
Y =
µ
zv(1−η)−η
Z z
0
x1−ηi di
¶ 1
1−η
, η ∈ [0, 1) , v ∈ [0, 1) , (1)
where the inputs are a continuum of intermediate goods xi, i ∈ [0, z], being z the total number of
intermediate goods at t. Since intermediate goods are not perfect substitutes, firms in the interme-
diate goods sector face a downward slopping demand curve which confers to them some degree of
market power. Thus, η is the inverse of the elasticity of the demand for each intermediate good and
measures the degree of market power. In a symmetric equilibrium, all the firms in the intermediate
goods sector produce the same output level x and, thus, Y = zv+1x. Then, the elasticity of output
6The time subscripts of the production side of the economy have been eliminated to keep notation simple.
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with respect to the number of firms z is given by the “degree of returns to specialization” v, as
in Ethier (1982). This parameter measures the degree to which society benefits from specializing
production between a large number of intermediate goods z. As a result an increase in the variety of
inputs improves the total factor productivity of the final goods technology. This formulation of the
production function allows us to separate the eﬀect of both the mark-up and the economies of scale
in the optimal government policy. Since there is free entry in the intermediate goods sector, at the
aggregate level the number of varieties z is determined by the zero profit condition. However, the
representative firm in the final goods sector takes this value as given. From its profit maximization
problem, given by
max
{xi}
Pz
v(1−η)−η
1−η
µZ z
0
x1−ηi di
¶ 1
1−η
−
Z z
0
pixidi, (2)
where pi is the price of the ith intermediate good and P is the price of the final output, we obtain
the inverse demand function for each intermediate input
xi =
³pi
P
´− 1η
zv
(1−η)
η −1Y. (3)
At each period, in the intermediate goods sector new firms can enter and produce a new variety.
Each firm produces at most one input for which it has market power. In order to operate, each
firm has to pay a fixed cost Pφ (measured in units of the final good). For sake of simplicity, we
assume there is no capital depreciation. All the firms produce the intermediate good according to
a constant returns to scale production function
xi = F (ki, li) , (4)
where ki and li denote capital and labor input, respectively, for firm i. The technology is assumed
to be strictly concave, C2, and satisfies the Inada conditions. Each firm solves
max
{ki,li}
πi = (1− τπ) [pixi − rki − wli]− Pφ, (5)
subject to the final goods sector demand, Eq.(3), and the production function, Eq.(4), where r is
the rental price of capital, w is the wage rate and τπ is a proportional tax on profits. The associated
first-order conditions of the firm problem yield
r = pi (1− η)Fk (ki, li) , (6)
w = pi (1− η)Fl (ki, li) . (7)
We consider the symmetric equilibrium in which all the firms produce the same output xi = x
with the same quantities of capital and labor, ki = k and li = l, set the same price pi = p and have
the same profits πi = π. The aggregate stock of capital is K = zk and the aggregate employment
is L = zl. Thus, in equilibrium, using Eq.(6) and Eq.(7), we can write the interest rate and the
wage as a function of total employment and capital7
r = p (1− η)FK (K,L) , (8)
w = p (1− η)FL (K,L) . (9)
7Note that the homogeneity of degree one of the production function implies that the partial derivatives are
homogenous functions of degree zero. Therefore, zv+1t F (kt, lt) = z
v
t F (Kt, Lt) and Fj(k, l) = Fj(zk, zl) = Fj(K,L)
for j = K,L.
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Moreover, at the symmetric equilibrium, the final output is equal to
Y = zvF (K,L) , (10)
and the price, by substituting Eq.(4) and Eq.(10) into Eq.(3), is
P = pz−v. (11)
The free entry assumption, for which each intermediate firm makes zero after-tax profits, i.e. π = 0,
endogenously determines the equilibrium number of firms. Therefore,
(1− τπ)pηF (K,L)
z
= Pφ. (12)
From Eq.(11) and Eq.(12), the total number of firms is equal to
z =
∙
(1− τπ)ηF (K,L)
φ
¸ 1
1−v
. (13)
Since the final cost is defined in terms of the final output, the entry of any firm reduces the relative
price between the final output and the intermediate goods P/p = z−v, and thus makes entry more
profitable. Finally, we consider as the numéraire the final good and normalize its price to one,
P = 1. Hence, the relative price of the intermediate goods becomes p = zv.
The entry of new firms can be interpreted as R&D in the production of new inputs, which
increases the total productivity of the economy, as in the endogenous growth literature. However,
our specification of the final goods production function, based on Benassy (1996), diﬀers from the
conventional endogenous growth model of Romer (1996). While Benassy (1996) shows that the
market equilibrium can generate too much innovation or entry (the number of intermediate goods
z is higher than in the social optimum equilibrium), the resources devoted to R&D are ineﬃciently
low in the models based on the Romer framework.8 Therefore, we can have two possible situations:
in the first the government has to subsidize the entry of new firms in order to foster innovation,
whereas in the second situation the government has to tax profits in order to restrict the entry of
new firms, since the entry of new firms represents a social waste of resources. Note that in our
model we obtain the standard formulation where p = P when v = 0. In particular, the model used
by Judd (1997) corresponds to the particular case of v = 0 and φ = 0, where the total number
of firms is fixed and normalized to one, zt = 1 for all t. In this particular formulation aggregate
returns to specialization are absent.
We consider a stand-in consumer that each period chooses consumption ct, savings st+1, and
the allocation of their one unit of time endowment between work Lt, and leisure (1 − Lt). We
assume there is no population growth. Formally, the consumers solve
V (s0) = max{ct,Lt,st+1}∞t=0
∞X
t=0
βtU (ct, Lt) (14)
s.to ct + st+1 = wt(1− τ lt)Lt + st
h
1 + rt(1− τkt )
i
+Πt + T
c
t , (15)
ct ≥ 0, Lt ∈ [0, 1], st+1 ≥ −B
8The standard formulation generally assumed in most of the endogenous growth and international trade literatures
corresponds with the case of v = η/ (1− η) < 1, where there exists a one-to-one relationship between the market
power and the degree of returns to specialization.
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where τkt and τ
l
t are the taxes on capital income and labor, respectively, T
c
t is a lump-sum
tax/transfer and Πt denotes aggregate profits. However, we know that in equilibrium Πt = 0.
The utility function U(·) is strictly concave, C2, and satisfies the usual Inada conditions. We as-
sume that B is a large positive constant that prevents Ponzi schemes. The solution to the consumer
problem yields the standard first-order conditions
Uct = βUct+1
h
1 + rt+1(1− τkt+1)
i
, (16)
−ULt
Uct
= wt(1− τ lt), (17)
together with a transversality condition for the savings. The equilibrium in the capital market is
given by
st+1 = Kt+1 +Dt+1, (18)
where Dt+1 denotes one-period government debt. Besides, the equilibrium in the output market
yields
ct +Kt+1 −Kt +Gt = zvt F (Kt, Lt)− φzt, (19)
where Gt denotes the period government expenditure and the equilibrium number of firms is given
by Eq.(13). Combining the consumer budget constraint with the aggregate resource constraint, the
free-entry condition and Eq.(18), we can derive the government budget constraint. Next, we define
the notion of market equilibrium of the described economy.
Definition 1 (Market equilibrium): Given a tax policy ψ =
©
τπt , τ
l
t, τ
k
t+1, T
c
t ,Dt
ª∞
t=0, govern-
ment expenditure {Gt}∞t=0, and the initial conditions K0 and D0, a market equilibrium is a set of
plans {ct, Lt,Kt+1, zt}∞t=0 satisfying 1) the household problem, 2) the firm problem in both sectors,
and 3) the market clearing conditions.
The following conditions are satisfied in the market equilibrium:
−ULt
Uct
= zvt (1− η)FL (Kt, Lt) (1− τ lt), (20)
Uct
βUct+1
= 1 + zvt+1 (1− η)FK (Kt+1, Lt+1) (1− τkt+1), (21)
together with the free entry condition (13) and the resource constraint (19). In this economy
the optimal fiscal policy is a sequence of taxes and government debt bψ = {bτπt ,bτ lt,bτkt+1, bT ct , bDt}∞t=0
associated with a market equilibrium that yields the highest level of utility to the representative
consumer. In the presence of lump-sum taxes and transfers it is well-known that the government
can achieve Pareto eﬃcient allocations. The scope of this paper is to study the optimal fiscal policy
when these transfers are not available. However, the analysis of the first-best policy is useful to
illustrate the trade-oﬀs that the government faces when is restricted to use distortionary taxes, and
show the diﬀerent ineﬃciencies introduced by the monopolistic competition sector.
3. Social optimum and first-best policy
Next, we show that the outcomes in the decentralized economy are not Pareto eﬃcient. We can
asses Pareto optimality by comparing the market allocation and the social optimum. The social
planner can control the number of firms in the intermediate goods sector. Thus, the planner faces
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a trade-oﬀ between the fixed costs that society pays for the introduction of a new firm and the
productivity gains associated to the introduction of a new variety.
The social planner takes as given the sequence of public expenditure {Gt}∞t=0 and the initial
level of the capital stock K0. For a symmetric allocation across intermediate goods, the social
planner solves
V (K0) = max
y
∞X
t=0
βtU (ct, Lt) (14)
s.to ct +Kt+1 −Kt +Gt = zvt F (Kt, Lt)− φzt, ∀t, (19)
and the usual non-negativity constraints ct ≥ 0 and Lt ∈ [0, 1], where y = {ct, Lt,Kt+1, zt}∞t=0. The
associated first-order conditions yield
−ULt
Uct
= zvt FL (Kt, Lt) , (22)
Uct
βUct+1
= 1 + zvt+1FK (Kt+1, Lt+1) , (23)
Uct
£
vzv−1t F (Kt, Lt)− φ
¤
= 0, (24)
together with a transversality condition for the capital and the economy resource constraint. Eq.(24)
notes that the increase in the total factor productivity due to an increase in zt, vzv−1t F (Kt, Lt) ,
which represents the marginal social benefit of a new firm, must be equal to the entry cost φ,
which represents the marginal social cost of the new entry. Rearranging this equation we obtain
an explicit expression for the eﬃcient number of firms,
zt =
∙
vF (Kt, Lt)
φ
¸ 1
1−v
, v > 0. (25)
Note that when v = 0 we have a corner solution, where the entry of a new firm does not increase
the productivity of the final goods sector but duplicates the fixed costs. Therefore, the optimal
government policy is to allow only one (normalized) firm in the market, z = 1.
Next, we use the social planner solution to asses the eﬃciency of the market allocation. First,
we analyze the price-marginal cost distortion or mark-up distortion. An inspection of Eq.(20) and
Eq.(22) reveals that the monopoly power in the intermediate goods sector reduces the wage below
the marginal productivity of labor. Hence, there is a distortion in the household labor/consumption
decision. At the same time, capital is paid below its marginal productivity, as the comparison of
Eq.(21) and Eq.(23) shows, and therefore there is a distortion in the intertemporal household
decision. Under monopolistic competition, the mark-up distortion does not depend on the number
of firms in the market. Hence, even though we are in the case where z has been set at the social
planner level, capital and labor are not paid according to its marginal productivity. Thus, the
government can attain a Pareto eﬃcient allocation by choosing
τkt = τ
l
t = −η/(1− η), ∀t. (26)
The subsidies, which depend only on the mark-up magnitude, ensure that the private return and the
social return coincide and then, as in Judd (1997), the distortion on capital accumulation generated
by the monopoly power is eﬀectively eliminated.
There exists a second distortion: the market equilibrium can generate an ineﬃcient level of firms,
since when a firm has to decide if entering into the market, it only considers if the monopoly profits
are higher than the fixed cost, and it ignores the productivity gains generated by the introduction
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of a new intermediate good. Hence, the private benefits from entry (monopoly profits) can be
diﬀerent than the social benefits (productivity increase). In contrast with the social planner’s choice
in Eq.(25), the market allocation for z in Eq.(13) is divided by η instead of v. The introduction
of a new firm in the market is determined by two opposite eﬀects: a complementary eﬀect and
a business-stealing eﬀect. The complementary eﬀect arises from the fact that a new firm in the
market raises the demand by increasing the productivity in the final goods sector. Then, since
profits increase relative to the fixed cost, entry becomes more profitable. The complementary eﬀect
tends to generate an ineﬃciently low number of firms, since firms do not take into account the
positive eﬀect on the total productivity when they enter into the market. The business-stealing
eﬀect is due to the fact that the existing firms in the market have to share the demand with the
new firm although this new firm produces a diﬀerentiated product and it does not compete directly
with the incumbent firms. Therefore, individual profits decline with the number of firms. The
business-stealing eﬀect tends to produce an excessive entry of firms, since new firms enter into
the market attracted by high profits but they do not take into account the negative eﬀect on the
incumbent firms. Then, if the government does not control the entry, the market could generate
a number of firms too low (high) relative to the social optimum when monopoly profits are too
low (high). Therefore, by comparing Eq.(13) and Eq.(25), the Pareto eﬃcient allocation implies
setting9
τπt = (η − v)/η, ∀t. (27)
The profits tax can be positive, negative or zero, depending on the relationship between the
mark-up and the returns to specialization. When these returns are strong enough, then entry is
insuﬃcient and it is better to subsidize profits since the increase in the productivity of the economy
due to a new firm oﬀsets the fixed cost. When the returns to specialization are low enough, there
is excessive entry and a positive profits tax results. When both the mark-up and the returns to
specialization coincide, free market entry is optimal. Note that the profits tax does not depend on
the other taxes, which means that the tax distortions do not matter when the R&D has to be set.
One of the main problems with the analysis of the previous cases is that it relies on the existence
of lump-sum taxation. In reality governments are far from having access to this class of instruments,
so that they must rely on distortionary taxes. As a result, governments have to prioritize the
distortions when choosing the optimal fiscal policy.
4. Optimal taxation and second-best policy
In this section we state and solve the government problem. Then, we characterize the optimal
fiscal policy. Since the optimal fiscal policy depends on the set of instruments available to the
government, we consider three diﬀerent cases. In the first, the government disposes of a complete
set of fiscal instruments and, therefore, it can directly control entry through the profits tax. In
the second case, the government has to apply the same marginal tax to both the capital income
and the monopoly profits. In this case the government can indirectly control the entry through a
corporate tax. And in the third case, we assume that the number of firms cannot be aﬀected by
authority.
9The government can also implement the optimal level of varieties by introducing a lump-sum tax/subsidy for the
firm (measured in units of the final good) PtTxt . In this case, the optimal tax is
Txt = φ
³η
v
− 1
´
, v > 0,
and τπt = 0 ∀t. The sign of this instrument also depends on the relation between η and v. Note that when v = 0,
then Txt = ηF (K,L)− φ.
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In order to solve the government problem we use the primal approach of optimal taxation
proposed by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980). This approach is based on characterizing the set of
allocations that the government can implement for a given fiscal policy ψ = {τπt , τ lt, τkt+1,Dt}∞t=0.
The market equilibrium or the set of implementable allocations is described by the period resource
constraints, the equilibrium entry condition and the so-called implementability constraints. The
implementability constraints are the households’ present value budget constraint, after substituting
in the first-order conditions of the consumers’ and the firms’ problems. These constraints capture
that changes in the tax policy have an eﬀect on agents’ decisions and prices. Thus, the government
problem is to maximize its objective function over the set of implementable allocations. This is
called the Ramsey allocation problem. From the optimal allocations we can decentralize the market
economy finding the prices and the optimal fiscal policy.
Next, we define the set of implementable allocations and establish the equivalence to the defini-
tion of market equilibrium given in section 2. The derivation of the set of implementable allocations
is described in the Appendix.
Definition 2 (Set of implementable allocations): The set of implementable allocations is
characterized by Eq.(13), Eq.(19) and the implementability constraint
∞X
t=0
βt(ctUct + LtULt) = Uc0
h
1 + zv0 (1− η)FK (K0, L0) (1− τk0)
i
(K0 +D0) . (28)
The set of implementable allocations depends on the policy variables {τπt }∞t=0 and the allocation
y = {ct,Kt+1, Lt, zt}∞t=0.
Proposition 1: An allocation in the market equilibrium y = {ct,Kt+1, Lt, zt}∞t=0 satisfies the set
of implementable allocations. Moreover, if an allocation y = {ct,Kt+1, Lt, zt}∞t=0 is implementable,
then we can construct a fiscal policy ψ =
©
τkt+1, τ
l
t, τ
π
t ,Dt+1
ª∞
t=0 and prices {rt, wt}∞t=0, such that
the allocation together with prices and the policy ψ constitute a market equilibrium.
Proof : See the Appendix.
It is well-known that the government has an incentive to heavily tax the initial wealth of
the consumer. This policy amounts to a nondistortionary lump-sum tax and, as a result, the
Lagrange multiplier of the implementability constraint would be zero. Given that we already have
characterized the first-best policy, we assume that the initial capital income tax τk0 is given.
4.1. Profits tax
In the present formulation we assume that the government uses a tax on variable profits to control
the number of firms in the intermediate goods sector. As a result the choice of τπt can determine
directly the number of firms zt and, then, the government will set a subsidy in case of an insuﬃcient
entry or a positive tax in case of an excessive entry. Using this fact we can reduce the number of
choice variables in the government problem by substituting the zero profit condition, Eq.(13), into
the aggregate resource constraint, Eq.(19), to obtain
ct +Kt+1 −Kt +Gt = F (Kt, Lt)
1
1−v [1− η(1− τπt )]
µ
η(1− τπt )
φ
¶ v
1−v
. (29)
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Given that the tax on variable profits, τπt , only appears in the aggregate resource constraint,
the optimal tax can be solved independently of the other allocations. The associated first-order
condition is
η(1− τπt )
v
1−v − [1− η(1− τπt )] (
v
1− v )(1− τ
π
t )
v
1−v−1 = 0, (30)
and rearranging terms we obtain the optimal tax 10
bτπt = (η − v)/η, v > 0. (31)
Note that when v = 0, then bτπt = 1− φ/ηF (Kt, Lt).
Substituting the optimal tax on variable profits into the free-entry condition in the market
equilibrium, we obtain that the government can implement the Pareto eﬃcient number of firms
with a tax/subsidy in the intermediate goods production. As long as v < η it is optimal to tax the
variable profits in the intermediate goods sector, bτπ > 0. When v > η the eﬃcient decentralization
implies a subsidy. When there exists a one-to-one relationship between the market power and the
degree of specialization, i.e. v = η/(1−η), the eﬃcient tax on variable profits is bτπ = −η/(1−η) < 0.
The optimal policy implies that if the government can tax/subsidize the variable profits in the
intermediate goods sector, this instrument can be used to implement the eﬃcient number of vari-
eties bzt = [vF (Kt, Lt) /φ] 11−v . When there is no profits tax, the market equilibrium number of firms
is zt = [ηF (Kt, Lt) /φ]
1
1−v , which shows that the government optimally sets the number of firms
having into account only the productivity gains associated to the introduction of a new variety.
Therefore, as long as this instrument is available we can ignore the choice of zt in the government
problem.
Definition 3 (Ramsey allocation problem): Given a sequence of government expenditure
{Gt}∞t=0, a sequence of firms {bzt}∞t=0, and the initial conditions {τk0,K0,D0}, the allocations asso-
ciated to the optimal fiscal policy ψ are derived by solving
V (K0,D0, τk0) = max{ct,Kt+1,Lt}∞t=0
∞X
t=0
βtU (ct, Lt) (14)
s.to
∞X
t=0
βt(ctUct + LtULt) = Uc0 (K0 +D0)
h
1 + zv0 (1− η)FK (K0, L0) (1− τk0)
i
, (28)
ct +Kt+1 −Kt +Gt = bzvt F (Kt, Lt)− φbzt, ∀t, (19)
where ct ≥ 0 and Lt ∈ [0, 1].
Let λ and αt be the Lagrange multiplier of the implementability constraint and the resource
constraint, respectively. The first-order conditions of the government problem with respect to
{ct, Lt,Kt+1} are 11
βt [Uct + λ (Uct + ctUctct + LtULtct)]− αt = 0, (32)
βt [ULt + λ (ULt + LtULtLt + ctUctLt)] + αtbzvt FL (Kt, Lt) = 0, (33)
10From now on a hat denotes optimality.
11Throughout the paper we assume that the solution of the Ramsey allocation problem exists and converges to an
unique steady-state. Neither of these assumptions are innocuous. The suﬃcient conditions for an optimum involve
third derivatives of the utility function. Therefore, the solution might not represent a maximum, or the system might
not have a solution because it does not exist a feasible policy that satisfies the intertemporal government budget
constraint. However, if the solution to the government problem exists and is interior, it satisfies the above first-order
conditions. Hence, the optimal tax analysis applies only to these cases.
11
−αt + αt+1[1 + bzvt+1FK (Kt+1, Lt+1)] = 0, (34)
together with a transversality condition for the capital, the period resource constraint and the
implementability constraint. Note that λ(ctUctmt +LtULtmt) for mt = ct, Lt, measures the eﬀect of
the distortionary taxes on the utility function. In particular, it can be interpreted as the amount
that the households would be willing to pay in order to replace one unit of distortionary tax revenue
by one unit of lump-sum revenue, all measured in terms of the consumption good at time zero. If the
implementability constraint does not bind, then λ = 0 and the government problem collapses into
the social planner problem. The resulting allocation can be decentralized as a market equilibrium
if the government has access to lump-sum taxation.
It is straightforward to find the optimal tax on capital income in the long-run. From the first-
order conditions of the government problem, Eq.(32) and Eq.(34), evaluated in steady-state, we
find
1
β
= 1 + zvFK(K,L). (35)
By comparing this condition with that of the market equilibrium, Eq.(21), evaluated in steady-
state, we find the optimal capital income tax for v ≥ 0, bτk = −η/ (1− η) . The next Proposition
summarizes these results.
Proposition 2: When a tax on variable profits is available to the government, then,
1) the sign of the optimal capital income tax in steady-state is negative regardless of the returns to
specialization.
2) the optimal profits tax is constant and its sign depends on the relationship between the mark-up
and the returns to specialization.
The optimal capital income tax in steady-state is negative regardless of the relative magnitude of
the returns to specialization with respect to the mark-up. The government faces a trade-oﬀ between
the business-stealing eﬀect and the complementary eﬀect, i.e. the fixed costs that society pays for
the introduction of a new firm and the productivity gains associated to the introduction of this
new variety. Since the government can control the entry of firms without distorting any individual
or firm decision, the degree of returns to specialization does not have any impact on the capital
income tax. By implementing the optimal capital income tax, the government recovers the eﬃcient
capital-labor ratio.12 Note that the optimal profits tax coincides with the social planner profits tax.
This implies that when the government decides to subsidize/tax R&D, it ignores the social cost of
the labor tax (the capital-labor ratio is not distorted and the magnitude of the subsidy/tax does not
depend on the labor tax distortion). Similarly to Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), the government
searches for aggregate production eﬃciency. The fiscal system should allow the economy to be
in the production frontier and then individual decisions among the possible combinations in the
frontier are distorted.
Except for the endogenous entry of firms bzvt , the first-order conditions for the government prob-
lem in the economy with imperfectly competitive markets yield the same conditions as an economy
12 If we assume that the tax on variable profits is not available to the government, but the number of firms in
the intermediate goods sector can be directly controled by setting a tax τxt on intermediate production x, then the
steady-state optimal policy implies bτx = η − v
η
, v > 0,
bτk = [(1− η) v − η] / (1− η) v, v > 0,
and when v = 0 then bτx = 1− φ/ηF (K,L) and bτk = 1− ηF (K,L)/ (1− η)φ. In fact, the government uses the tax
on output to eﬃciently set the number of varieties and after uses the capital income tax to eﬃciently set the capital
level by correcting the distortion due to the tax on output, so that (1− bτk)(1− bτx) = 1/ (1− η) .
12
with perfect competition. As a result we can extend some of the results of the uniform commodity
tax literature (see Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980). An inspection of the first-order conditions gives
some insight about the requirements that the utility function needs to satisfy in order to have
constant taxes from t > 1.
Corollary 1: For the class of utility functions that are additively separable (across time and goods)
and homothetic with respect to consumption and hours worked, the optimal policy from t > 1 pre-
scribes constant taxes.
Proof of Corollary 1: See the Appendix.
An example of utility function that satisfies this property is
U(ct, Lt) =
c1−σt
1− σ −
L1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
. (36)
4.2. Corporate tax
In the next case, we assume that the government cannot distinguish between capital income and
profits. Therefore, both taxes have to be the same in all periods, τkt = τ
π
t ∀t. We call them
corporate tax, τ ct . Guo and Lansing (1999) consider the optimal corporate tax when the number
of firms is fixed and where the corporate tax is used by the government as an indirect way to tax
the economic rents or monopoly profits. In our case, since profits determine the number of firms
in the market and thus the productivity of the economy, the government uses the corporate tax
to indirectly set the measure of firms zt. In contrast with Judd (1997), we find that the optimal
corporate tax depends on several variables, as the returns to specialization, the mark-up and the
fixed costs, but more importantly on the curvature degree of the production function.
The restriction on the set of instruments that the government can use takes the form of addi-
tional constraints on the Ramsey allocation problem. In this case, by substituting the tax from
Eq.(21) into the zero profit condition, we obtain the following new constraint for an allocation to
be implementable, µ
Uct−1
βUct
− 1
¶µ
η
φ(1− η)
¶
F (Kt, Lt) = ztFK (Kt, Lt) . (37)
From the government perspective, the tax distortion due either by the returns on savings or
by the introduction of a new firm has to be the same. In the Appendix it is shown that, from the
government optimal conditions, the following condition is satisfied in steady-state:
1
β
− 1 = zvFK
∙
v + 1− vε− (1− ε) (1− τ
c) η
φ
¸
, (38)
where ε = εFK ,K/εF,K = (FKKK/FK) / (FKK/F ) < 0 is the inverse ratio between the elasticities of
the production function and of the marginal productivity of capital with respect to the capital, and
represents the curvature degree of the production function. Combining this equation with Eq.(21)
evaluated in steady-state, we find the optimal corporate tax, bτ c = [η (1− ε− φ)− φv(1− ε)] /
[φ+ η (1− ε− φ)] . The next Proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 3: When the government cannot diﬀerentiate between capital income and profits,
then the sign of the optimal corporate tax in steady-state is positive [negative] whenever v <
13
η (1− ε− φ) /φ(1− ε) [v > η (1− ε− φ) /φ(1− ε)].
When profits and capital income taxes cannot be diﬀerent, the government faces a trade-oﬀ
between eliminating distortions associated to the market power and determine the eﬃcient level
of entry. In general, we find that the optimal corporate tax can be positive, negative or zero. It
depends on the relative magnitude of the returns to specialization with respect to the mark-up,
the fixed cost and the curvature degree of the production function. If the fixed cost or the returns
to specialization are big enough, the government lowers the corporate tax in order to promote
the entry of new firms. The curvature degree of the production function shows the trade-oﬀ that
the government faces between the fixed costs that society pays for the introduction of a new firm
(business-stealing eﬀect) and the productivity gains associated to the introduction of a new variety
(complementary eﬀect).
Note that bτ c is always lower than one. When there are no returns to specialization, v = 0, thenbτ c > 0 if −ε > φ− 1. Next, we illustrate the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function.
Corollary 2: If the production function is F (K,L) = KuL1−u, where u is the production elasticity
with respect to the capital, then (1−ε) = 1/u and therefore the steady-state corporate tax is positivebτ c > 0 if either v < η (1− uφ) /φ or if u < 1/φ and v = 0.
4.3. Government cannot control entry-decisions
An alternative formulation to the government problem, the third case, assumes that the number of
firms or varieties cannot be aﬀected by the fiscal authority. This is an extreme case, but it helps to
understand the previous results. Since the government cannot tax profits, i.e. τπt = 0 ∀t, the zero
profit condition without taxes becomes a constraint for an allocation to be implementable,
ηzv−1t F (Kt, Lt) = φ, (39)
and combining it with the aggregate resource constraint we have
ct +Kt+1 −Kt +Gt = (1− η)F (Kt, Lt)
1
1−v
µ
η
φ
¶ v
1−v
. (40)
In this formulation the government treats zt as an exogenous variable. However, it knows that
it can aﬀect the measure of firms by changing the aggregate level of output, but it has to bear a
cost in terms of utility by modifying the consumption and leisure paths.
Let λ and αt be the Lagrange multiplier associated to the implementability constraint and the
new resource constraint, respectively. Then, the associated first-order conditions with respect to
{ct, Lt,Kt+1} are
βt {Uct + λ[Uct + ctUctct + LtULtct ]}− αt = 0, (41)
βt {ULt + λ[ULt + LtULtLt + ctUctLt ]}+ αt
(1− η)
(1− v)z
v
t FL (Kt, Lt) = 0, (42)
−αt + αt+1[1 +
(1− η)
(1− v)z
v
t+1FK (Kt+1, Lt+1)] = 0. (43)
It is straightforward to find the optimal tax on capital income. From the first-order conditions of
the government problem evaluated in steady-state we have
1
β
= 1 +
(1− η)
(1− v)z
vFK(K,L), (44)
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and comparing this condition with Eq.(21) evaluated in steady-state, we obtain the optimal capital
income tax bτk = −v/(1− v). The next Proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 4: When the government cannot control entry-decisions, then the sign of the optimal
capital income tax in steady-state is negative regardless of the magnitude of the mark-up. Never-
theless, when v = 0 the optimal capital income tax is zero.
The optimal capital income tax does not depend on the magnitude of the mark-up, as in the
case where the government can tax profits. Since the government cannot control firms’ entry, it uses
the capital income tax to correct partially the eﬀects of the returns to specialization. Consequently,
the magnitude of the mark-up does not have any impact on the capital income tax.
One particular case deserves special attention. In the absence of aggregate returns to special-
ization, v = 0, it is optimal not to subsidy/tax the investment decisions of the intermediate goods
firms. For this case, the introduction of a new firm only has negative consequences: a business-
stealing eﬀect associated to the new entry, which translates into a social waste of resources by
means of the fixed cost. As a result, the government tries to minimize the negative eﬀects by
only implementing one variety in equilibrium, z = 1, and hence the zero profit condition becomes
F (Kt, Lt) = φ/η. This condition is eﬀectively an isoquant that determines the equilibrium level of
output, and shows that the government cannot increase simultaneously capital and labor to achieve
the eﬃcient plant level without violating the entry condition. With a concave production function
the government chooses not to subsidize capital, and place all the tax burden in labor income taxes.
When z cannot be controlled, a capital subsidy/tax would lead to an ineﬃcient capital-labor ratio.
This result is rather surprising, because in equilibrium the optimal number or measure of firms
is one, as in Judd (1997). However, the threat of endogenous entry makes the prescribed capital
income tax to be zero instead of negative.
This finding is consistent with some theoretical findings in the industrial organization literature.
When the government cannot control the entry decisions on a market and there are no returns to
specialization, a tax or a subsidy leads to a socially ineﬃcient number of firms since it increases
the fixed costs; this is called ineﬃcient economies of scale. This result proves to be more general
because we are considering a dynamic general equilibrium analysis instead of a partial equilibrium.
Finally, using the same arguments than in the Proof of Corollary 1, it is straightforward to extend
the results of Proposition 4 to the transition path.
5. Conclusions
In recent papers, Judd (1997, 2002) has presented evidence in favor of a negative capital income
tax. Using a representative-agent model with a fixed number of goods produced by monopolistic
competitive firms, he finds that the optimal fiscal policy implies a negative capital income tax and
a 100% tax rate on firms profits.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that, once we consider an endogenous number
of firms or varieties, the optimal fiscal policy can lead to diﬀerent results. In contrast with Judd
(1997), we identify some additional sources and parameters that aﬀect the sign of both the capital
income tax and the profits tax, since the optimal fiscal policy aﬀects the size of the intermediate
goods sector. In particular, if we introduce both an index of market power and an index of returns
to specialization, the government faces a trade-oﬀ between the fixed costs that the society pays for
the introduction of a new firm and the productivity gains associated to this new variety. Both the
optimal capital income tax and the optimal profits tax depend on the relationship between these
two parameters and the fiscal instruments available to the government, because the government
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eﬀectiveness to control the entry-exit of firms depends on them.
We consider three diﬀerent cases. In the first case, the government disposes of a complete set
of fiscal instruments and, therefore, it can directly control entry through the profits tax. We show
that the optimal capital income tax is negative regardless of the relative magnitude of the returns
to specialization with respect to the mark-up. However, the optimal profits tax depends on this
relationship. In the second case, the government has to apply the same marginal tax to both the
capital income and the monopoly profits. In this case, the government can indirectly control the
firms’ entry through a corporate tax. We find that the optimal corporate tax depends not only
on the magnitude of the returns to specialization and the mark-up, but also on the fixed cost and
the curvature degree of the production function. This curvature degree of the production function
shows the trade-oﬀ that the government faces between the fixed costs that society pays for the
introduction of a new firm and the productivity gains associated to this new variety. Finally, the
third case assumes that the number of firms or varieties cannot be aﬀected by authority. Under
this restriction, we find that the optimal capital income tax does not depend on the magnitude of
the mark-up but it does on the returns to specialization. The implied value is zero in the absence
of returns to specialization or negative otherwise.
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Appendix
Derivation of the set of implementable allocations: The implementability constraint can be
derived as follows. Multiplying Eq.(17) by Lt we have
−LtULt = Uctwt
³
1− τ lt
´
Lt. (A.1)
Multiplying Eq.(15) by Uct and using Eq.(A.1) gives
ctUct + LtULt = stUct
h
1 + rt(1− τkt )
i
− st+1Uct . (A.2)
Multiplying Eq.(A.2) by βt and adding up from t = 0 to t =∞ yields
∞X
t=0
βt (ctUct + LtULt) = s0Uc0
h
1 + r0(1− τk0)
i
+
∞X
t=0
βt
³
βst+1Uct+1
h
1 + rt+1(1− τkt+1)
i
− st+1Uct
´
. (A.3)
Using Eq.(A.3), Eq.(8), Eq.(16) and Eq.(18) we obtain the implementability constraint.
Proof of Proposition 1: The first part of the proposition is always satisfied, since any market
equilibrium allocation has to satisfy the resource constraint, the zero profit condition and the imple-
mentability constraint. Now we prove the second part of the proposition. Given an implementable
allocation {ct,Kt+1, Lt, zt}∞t=0, the market prices can be back out using Eq.(8), Eq.(9) and Eq.(11).
The fiscal policy ψ = {τkt+1, τ lt, τπt ,Dt+1}∞t=0 is recovered from Eq.(13), Eq.(16) and Eq.(17). The
debt level is found from the market clearing condition in the capital markets, Eq.(18). Substituting
Uct and ULt in the implementability constraint we obtain the consumer budget constraints. Finally,
given the tax on capital income τkt+1 and the interest rate rt+1, by arbitrage we find the return on
government debt. If the resource constraint, the consumers budget constraints and the arbitrage
condition are satisfied, then the government budget constraint is also satisfied.
Proof of Corollary 1: The class of utility functions that are additively separable (across time
and goods) and homothetic with respect to consumption and hours worked satisfies
LtULtLt + ctUctLt = BULt , (A.4)
ctUctct + LtULtct = DUct , (A.5)
where B and D are diﬀerent constants and separability between consumption and hours worked
implies UctLt = ULtct = 0. In this case, the first-order conditions of the government problem can
be written as
Uct
βUct+1
= 1 + bzvt+1FK (Kt+1, Lt+1) , (A.6)
and
− [1 + λ(1 +B)]ULt
[1 + λ(1 +D)]Uct
= bzvt FL (Kt, Lt) , (A.7)
where λ is constant. Clearly, from the market equilibrium Eq.(21), we derive the optimal capital
income tax bτkt+1 = − η(1− η) . (A.8)
17
From the consumption-labor decisions we can derive the optimal labor tax
1− bτ lt = [1 + λ(1 +D)][1 + λ(1 +B)] 1(1− η) . (A.9)
For the example stated in Corollary 1 we have D = −σ and B = ϕ, and clearly D < B. Note that
λ, and therefore bτ l, depends on the initial conditions K0 and D0. Both taxes are constant for t > 1.
At t = 1, the first-order conditions contain additional terms.
Derivation of Eq.(38): Substituting Eq.(37) into the aggregate resource constraint, we obtain a
new resource constraint,
ct +Kt+1 −Kt +Gt =
⎡
⎣
³
Uct−1
βUct
− 1
´
η
φ (1− η)FK (Kt, Lt)
⎤
⎦
v
F (Kt, Lt)
v+1 −
³
Uct−1
βUct
− 1
´
ηF (Kt, Lt)
(1− η)FK (Kt, Lt)
. (A.10)
Let λ and αt be the Lagrange multiplier of the implementability constraint and the new resource
constraint, respectively. The first-order conditions of the government problem with respect to
{ct, Lt,Kt+1}, after substituting for Eq.(37), are
βt [Uct + λ (Uct + ctUctct + LtULtct)]− αt
⎛
⎝1 +
⎡
⎣ Uct−1Uctct
βU2ct
³
Uct−1
βUct
− 1
´
⎤
⎦ [vzvt F (Kt, Lt)− ztφ]
⎞
⎠
+αt+1
⎡
⎣ Uctct
βUct+1
³
Uct
βUct+1
− 1
´
⎤
⎦ £vzvt+1F (Kt+1, Lt+1)− zt+1φ¤ = 0, (A.11)
βt [ULt + λ (ULt + LtULtLt + ctUctLt)] + αtz
v
t
∙
(v + 1)FL (Kt, Lt)− v
F (Kt, Lt)FKL (Kt, Lt)
FK (Kt, Lt)
¸
−αtzt
∙
FL (Kt, Lt)
F (Kt, Lt)
− FKL (Kt, Lt)
FK (Kt, Lt)
¸
= 0, (A.12)
−αt + αt+1
©
1 +
£
zvt+1FK (Kt+1, Lt+1)
¤
Ã
v + 1 +
∙
F (Kt+1, Lt+1)FKK (Kt+1, Lt+1)
FK (Kt+1, Lt+1)FK (Kt+1, Lt+1)
¸"
z1−vt+1
F (Kt+1, Lt+1)
− v
#
−
z1−vt+1
F (Kt+1, Lt+1)
!)
= 0.
(A.13)
Evaluating Eq.(A.12) in steady-state and dividing it by the same equation one period forward, we
obtain that
βαt = αt+1. (A.14)
Noting that ε = εFK ,K/εF,K = (FKKK/FK) / (FKK/F ) < 0 and using Eq.(13) and Eq.(A.14), in
steady-state Eq.(A.13) becomes Eq.(38).
18
References
Atkinson, A.B. and J. Stiglitz, 1980, Lectures on Public Economics, McGraw-Hill, New York.
Benassy, J.P., 1996, Taste for Variety and Optimum Production Patterns in Monopolistic Com-
petition, Economics Letters 52, 41-47.
Benassy, J.P., 1998, Is There Always Too Little Research in Endogenous Growth with Expanding
Product Variety?, European Economic Review 42, 61—69.
Chamley, C., 1986, Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with Infinite
Lives, Econometrica 54, 607-622.
de Groot, H.L.F. and R. Nahuis, 1998, Taste for Diversity and the Optimality of Economic Growth,
Economics Letters 58, 291—295.
Diamond, P.A. and J.A. Mirrlees, 1971, Optimal Taxation and Public Production: I—Production
Eﬃciency, American Economic Review 61, 8-27.
Dixit, A.K. and J.E. Stiglitz, 1977, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity,
American Economic Review 67, 297-308.
Ethier, W.J., 1982, National and International Returns to Scale in the Modern Theory of Inter-
national Trade, American Economic Review 72, 389-405.
Grossman, G.M. and E. Helpman, 1991, Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, MIT
Press, Cambridge.
Guo, J.T. and K.J. Lansing, 1999, Optimal Taxation of Capital Income with Imperfectly Com-
petitive Product Markets, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 23, 967-695.
Jones, C.I. and J.C. Williams, 2000, Too Much of a Good Thing? The Economics of Investment
in R&D, Journal of Economic Growth 5, 65—85.
Jones, L.E., R.E. Manuelli and P.E. Rossi, 1993, Optimal Taxation in Models of Endogenous
Growth, Journal of Political Economy 101, 485-517.
Judd, K.L., 1985, Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model, Journal of Public
Economics 28, 59-83.
Judd, K.L., 1997, The Optimal Tax Rate for Capital Income is Negative, NBER Working Paper
6004.
Judd, K.L., 2002, Capital-Income Taxation with Imperfect Competition, American Economic
Review 92, 417-421.
Kim, J., 2004, What Determines Aggregate Returns to Scale?, Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, forthcoming.
Romer P.M, 1986, Increasing Returns and Long Run Growth, Journal of Political Economy 94,
1002-1037.
Schmitt-Grohé, S. and M. Uribe, 2004, Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy under Imperfect
Competition, Journal of Macroeconomics, forthcoming.
19
